

SECRET [ ]

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7

China (Fri Brief)

1200, 20 Nov 80

Deng Xiaoping retains the political initiative in Beijing, where he is attempting to nail down a series of reforms designed to ensure orderly decision-making, provide for an orderly succession, and concentrate Chinese energies on modernizing the economy.

Deng has won most of his battles so far, but the going has been tough and the costs have been high. His base of support is probably narrower than it was a year or two ago, particularly in the military and in segments of the economic bureaucracy. Deng's personality is still the glue that holds things together in Beijing, but he is 76 and won't live forever. Lots of loose ends regarding the succession remain to be tied up.

Deng and his allies, by emphasizing pragmatism, have got to produce results--visible economic growth and diplomatic successes. Neither is guaranteed. Critics remain waiting in the wings to capitalize on any faltering in the new programs (including the opening to the US).

Economic performance obviously is a key in all this, but the Chinese are still groping to discover the best approach to their many problems. Economic growth this year may fall well below the long-run trend of five to six percent. Reforms are still being resisted and have caused initial confusion in many cases.

Ambitious plans have been sharply scaled back, particularly in the area of capital construction. Beijing is now concentrating on difficult infrastructure problems, especially energy. This is rational and should produce good long-term results, but precludes splashy short-term results which could be politically useful.

Foreign trade remains a bright spot.

China remains militarily much inferior to the USSR. There is no short-term solution to this problem, and foreign arms and technology purchases can only affect the margins of the basic problem.

Military modernization remains a goal, but has a lesser priority than agricultural growth and than modernization of the economic infrastructure. Elements of the military are grumbling about this order of things, but basic priorities are not likely to change soon.

In consequence, China must rely on clever diplomatic maneuvering (plus the prospect of prolonged, low-level resistance if the Soviets attack) to ward off the threat from Moscow.

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7

SECRET [ ]

25X1

SECRET

## LIBERIA

The military coup in Liberia in April 1980 led by Sgt. Doe and a group of enlisted men toppled a political system that had survived for 133 years and reversed the domination of the Americo-Liberian elite over the indigenous population. After seven months in power, the ruling military is having difficulty dealing with urgent problems--most of them economic--or establishing policy direction for the future.

The coup has made more precarious the historical US-Liberian "special relationship," under which the US has enjoyed unqualified diplomatic support on international issues, access to Liberia's port and airfield, and the right to build and maintain important US communications facilities in the country. These include a Voice of America transmitter, a regional telecommunications center and a Coast Guard navigation center. Although US personnel and facilities have not been threatened, the possibility exists that the pro-US sentiment that has prevailed so far could erode if the country's current fragile political and economic system breaks down.

Monrovia's most pressing economic problems are the recurrent payments crises generated by monthly government payrolls or large foreign payments. Currency flight and hoarding subsequent to the coup and the general unwillingness of international banks to sharply increase exposure in Liberia have created a serious credit crunch. Uncontrolled spending by the military government and reduced tax revenues have led to \$6-8 million monthly deficits and resulted in the loss--at least temporarily--of access to \$70 million remaining under an IMF standby agreement. Business uncertainty arising from perceived political instability has been exacerbated by official harassment of expatriate firms and excessive worker demands. Major firms are already considering cut backs in operations and are delaying new investment plans. US economic and military aid has been useful in demonstrating our interest in the new regime, preventing food shortages, and providing badly needed support for head-of-state Doe, but has not been large enough to materially reduce Liberia's problems.

Even though the leaders have stated that they will pursue a more non-aligned foreign policy, they have looked first to the US to provide large amounts of economic and military aid, and have sometimes been critical of what they regard as a meager US response.

Radical African governments such as Ethiopia and Libya have sought to ingratiate themselves with the new regime. The Soviets and Cubans have stepped up their contacts with Liberian officials, hoping to gain a foothold in the country. The Soviets reportedly have offered some military aid, but no agreements have been concluded. The Liberians have, so far, been cautious in their dealings with these countries, and any closer association may continue to be tempered by an anti-Communist sentiment among the general population. But Soviet or Ethiopian offers of military equipment or training could prove hard for the military leaders to resist, especially if US aid does not meet their expectations.

SECRET

DCI Notes  
0800, 20 Nov 80

### Soviet Strategic Programs (Fri Brief)

Complex - long term issue:

How judge current balance

How likely to trend in '80s

Soviets are basically pleased with recognition of their achievement of parity or perhaps even superiority with the US in strategic weaponry.

The issue which more than any other dominates perceptions of strategic balance in this country--and abroad--this is the vulnerability of US ICBMs to a first strike by the Soviets. At present, our calculations show only 30% of US ICBM force would survive such an attack this downward trend as increasingly accurate Soviet ICBMs come on line. By 1985 only about 10% of the US ICBM force would survive a first strike attack.

ICBMs are not the full force of either side, however. We next can measure what the total US surviving capability would be if the Soviets attacked us first; and compare it with what the Soviets would have remaining after such an attack.

The calculations show that the Soviets would exceed us in the total of residual destructive power until about 1988. Nevertheless, US ability to retaliate after absorbing a first strike would still be considerable. The remaining US forces would be capable of taking out the bulk of the Soviet urban area, the economic base, and their non-silo military targets. After 1988 there is not only a sharp reversal, but the absolute Soviet residual force would have a very limited capability even against US urban areas. This is due to our build up of CMs & MX.

What are the Soviets likely to do about this projected sharp reversal in position in the late 1980s?

The Soviets will see MX as acting as a sponge to soak up thousands of their warheads. They could counter by building more (their throw-weight helps here). We could counter-counter by building more MX shelters. If the race is unconstrained by SALT limits and starts soon, it would be difficult for the US to "win."

If SALT limits prevail through 1990, an expansion of about 50% in MX shelters would "win." In between the result is mixed. I believe the Soviets will want to avoid this kind of hypothetical race. They would prefer to keep perceptions where they are today; they have a generous respect for our technological and industrial capacity (remembering how rapidly we built up our ICBM force in response to the "missile gap" of 1960); and they do not want to strain their

SECRET  

25X1

struggling economy if they can avoid it. Still, they will not hesitate to strain themselves if they perceive the late '80s as we do. Much will depend on whether they believe that we will be resolute in following through on the cruise missile and MX and TNF programs.

The deployment of cruise missiles and MX also threatens to affect the survivability of the Soviet ICBMs by the late 1980s, as shown on Chart 10. To improve their force survivability they could deploy larger numbers of SLBMs or deploy mobile ICBMs, or deploy long-range cruise missiles. They could also try defending their ICBMs by a widespread ABM system.

Mobile systems, particularly cruise missiles and ICBMs, will make verification of future SALT agreements even more difficult.

In light of stark contrast in projected Soviet strategic position in the first half of the 1980s and the threat to it in the last half, we must ask whether the Soviets will attempt to take advantage of what some have referred to as the "window of opportunity" of the early to mid-1980s.

Because even before they achieved parity the Soviets have regularly exploited opportunities in the Third World and have taken necessary measures to secure Eastern Europe, I don't believe their new strategic power position will embolden them much more. It may well, however, make their task easier as other nations perceive them to be in the military ascendancy and they will encourage that attitude.

Now, as a generation ago, Soviets will move to exploit opportunities when they believe the risk of US counteraction to be low.

Thus, even in the early to mid-1980s, we expect the Soviets to probe and challenge the US in various situations to determine at what point the US is likely to react strongly. We do not, however, believe they will "go for broke" in the next few years.

SECRET  

25X1

SECRET

25X1

DCI Notes  
0800, 20 Nov 80

NATO-WP (Fri Brief)

NATO always tried use quality make up for quantity.

Soviets have conducted steady modernization and are eliminating much of quality advantage we've had.

Their advantage in #'s remains; even grows on mobilization.

Margin of advantage these conditions provide not wide enough to make starting war an attractive proposition.

Especially in view risk of escalation to at least tactical nuclear warfare, the uncertain reliability of East Europe, the threat of the Chinese on their other flank and the traditionally conservative Soviet military doctrine of massive force.

But is wide enough that coupled with strategic perception that NATO allies not thinking in terms of trying to match militarily.

25X1

TOP SECRET

NIO/GPF

17 November 1980

1200

## TALKING POINTS

NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Briefing will provide comparison of NATO-Warsaw Pact forces in Europe emphasizing:

- Soviet perception of balance (based on excellent, but sensitive information);
- Modernization trends;
- Nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.

Traditionally, NATO has counted on quality to counter Warsaw Pact quantity advantage.

- Quality gap narrowing; Soviet modernization impressive;
- Quantity margin adequate to give Soviets confidence that NATO allies will not try to match the Pact;
- Margin not wide enough to make war attractive.

## 2. SOVIET POSTURE OPPOSITE NATO

Soviet ground, naval, and air forces designed to protect longest land border of any nation.

- Emphasis on Europe; 55% of ground forces opposite NATO, but cannot forget China or Southern region (Afghanistan, Iran);
- Ground forces designed for fast, deep armor-heavy offensive; nuclear or non-nuclear;
- Air forces organized for air defense of homeland and

Chart 1  
Map of USSR

TOP SECRET/

25X1

- Navy centered around ballistic missile submarines, combat on the periphery of land theaters and interruption of NATO SLOC.

Consider Central Europe as decisive area.

- Have capacity to conduct combined ground-air offensive campaign;
- Key issue is readiness and warning time.
  - Soviet forces not fully ready for war on daily basis;
  - Forces in forward area--highest state of readiness; others low readiness;
  - 30% of divisions opposite NATO are Category III (10-30% personnel manning, lack support equipment; 72 hours to mobilize; need training);
  - Naval forces: half available in five days; three-fourths available in 25 days.
- Expect a period of tension before war; time to mobilize, prepare nation;
- US can detect mobilization within a day or two;
- Soviets would prefer to mobilize and attack with clear preponderance of force (five fronts); could attack with less (two or three fronts).

### 3. COMPARISONS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES

In terms of sheer numbers, the Soviet advantages are clear:

- Superiority in tanks--1.9:1 at M-Day; 2.5:1 after mobilization;

Chart 2  
Map of Center  
Region

Chart 3  
Static Comparisons

- Slight advantage in manpower;
- Significant advantage in divisions (2 to 1 after mobilization);
- NATO advantage in aircraft; 20% after mobilization.

Chart 4  
Soviet perception  
of buildup

Soviet perception of balance based on more than mere numbers; planning is based on correlation of forces; includes both quantitative and qualitative factors; takes into account modernization, training, quality of national forces (excellent evidence: detailed in writing, practiced in exercises).

Soviet perception of correlation of forces (force balance) is more conservative than numbers indicate:

- Rate ground forces as roughly equal at M-Day; gain 1.8:1 advantage after mobilization;
- Rate NATO combat aircraft superior both before and after mobilization--clear NATO advantage exceeding actual inventory comparison.

Transition: following charts show Soviets view of modernization, conservative.

Chart 5  
Tank moderniza-  
tion

Soviet view of tank quality: chart shows their perception of tank production and quality.

- New model every 5-8 years; large annual production (2,000);
- Rated NATO and WP tanks equal in '60s;
- Rated WP superior in '70s;
- Expect to match NATO tanks in '80s.

Bottom line--can match NATO quality, exceed NATO quantity.



Chart 6  
Aircraft

Modernization with Soviet perception of quality; WP expects NATO advantage to continue into '80s.

Rates NATO superior in avionics, pilot training, munitions.

Chart 7  
TNF

Soviets have this view of the theater nuclear force balance:

- NATO leads in SR (artillery, rockets);
- WP leads in MR;
- WP and NATO both emphasizing improvements in LR  
(Toranado, F-16, Fencer, P-II, SS-20, cruise missile).

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Chart 8

Probable Soviet view of comparative strengths.

Chart represents best estimate about how Soviets assess basic conventional/tac nuc military balance.

Soviets are confident that they have the edge in the areas shows, but they know that they face:

- Superior NATO airpower and seapower;
- Flexible command and control system;
- Superior industrial and manpower reserves;
- Forces with the advantage of the defender;
- A cohesive alliance.

#### What does this mean?

- Soviets strongest suit: confidence in their armed forces;
- Respectful of US technology base;
- Conservative in thinking (tend to overrate West) about size of force structure;

TOP SECRET/ [REDACTED]


25X1

- Concern about multiple enemies and uncertain allies.

On balance: can be confident in dealing with NATO alliance  
from a position of military strength.

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1



25X1


Top Secret

2

25X1

# Illustrative Warsaw Pact Ground Force Campaign in the Western TVD

Figure IV-1



Secret

577637 1-79 CIA


25X1

# MOBILIZATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE: 1980

SECRET

3

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7




Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7

M + 15


4

# Force Effectiveness Buildup in Central Europe (Soviet Effectiveness Perceptions)

## Ground Force Divisions/Brigades




## Tactical Air Forces



85

# Tank Modernization: Soviet View Annual Buy-Main Battle Tanks




25X1  
25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


25X1





# THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES - 1980 (excluding refiners) (high estimate)

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7



Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7

8

## **Probable Soviet View of Comparative Strengths**

### **Warsaw Pact**

**Chemical/Biologic Readiness**

**Landforce Mobility, Firepower**

**C<sup>3</sup> Centralized, Hardened**

**Initiative**

**Long Range Theater  
Nuclear Forces**

### **NATO**

**Airpower**

**C<sup>3</sup> More Flexible**

**Advantage of Defender**


**Seapower**

**Greater Reserves of Industry,  
Manpower**

**Reliable Allies**

**Top Secret**

25X1



**TOP SECRET** [REDACTED]

25X1

DCI Talking Points  
DRAFT/Brandwein  
17 November 1980, 1200

## SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

### I. The Current Situation

A. Soviets are basically pleased with recognition of their achievement of parity or perhaps even superiority with the US in strategic weaponry.

1. Through the possession of a large defense establishment which includes centralized direction and control of forces and a massive, well disciplined R&D organization, the willingness to give defense program a high priority in allocation of resources, the Soviets have been able to at least match and in some areas surpass the US in many of the commonly used measures of strategic force comparisons.

2. The only significant remaining US advantage is in numbers of warheads. Soviets lead in number of delivery vehicles, and equivalent megatonage, and have surpassed US accuracy capability in the latest version of their SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs.

B. Critical issue dominating perceptions in this country is vulnerability of US ICBMs to first strike by the Soviets.

Chart 1

1. At present, calculation shows only 30% of US ICBM force would survive such an attack, (some 55% of Soviet silo-based ICBMs would survive.) (See Chart 1)

### II. Prospects for the early 1980s

Chart 2

1. For the US, the vulnerability of its ICBMs will continue this downward trend the next few years, as increasingly accurate Soviet ICBMs come on line. (See Chart 2)

2. Moreover, because of the tremendous momentum of Soviet programs, not merely in offensive systems, but for defensive systems and command and control as well, the Soviets will have a number of options for making further progress in the next decade.

**TOP SECRET** [REDACTED]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

-2-

a. Five to seven ICBM programs (some may be mobile), a new class, large SSBN (displacement one and one-half times the Trident class), and possibly air-launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

b. In the defensive area they are continuing an active ABM R&D program, trying to add an effective low-altitude capability to their already massive air defense system, working on the very difficult ASW problem, and spending the equivalent of over two billion dollars per year on civil defense. They are also striving to achieve technological breakthrough in laser and directed energy weapons in the fields of air defense, anti-satellite systems, and missile defense.

c. In command and control, Soviets continue process of enhancing flexibility of control and integration of all echelons. They are also enhancing survivability and improving early warning capabilities.

### III. Prospects for the late 1980s

A. Despite the favorable trends for the Soviets in the early 1980s, the Soviets could be apprehensive about how long their hard won gains would last.

1. Soviets believe they face aroused US public opinion which is willing to spend more on defense, they fear US technology and industry.

2. They are also concerned about the nuclear threat from China, U.K., and France. They are particularly concerned about the NATO decision to deploy long range theater nuclear forces, which would be capable of striking Soviet territory.

3. The Soviet economic prospects for the 1980s look increasingly glum as they face decreasing productivity, which will cause further stringencies in funding defense programs.

4. Even before the election they were concerned with US strategic programs.

a. Cruise missile and Trident programs will further compound problems of defense.

b. They are particularly concerned about the MX.

5. The effect of the MX could be two-fold.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

-3-

a. On the one hand, MX shelters would reduce the Soviet counterforce threat by acting as a sponge to soak up thousands of RVs in wasted attacks on empty shelters. For example, after full 4600 MX shelter deployment, the Soviets would have to expend most of their ICBMs in a counterforce attack and would have few ICBMs left for attacks on other US military and economic targets, although the SLBM force could be so used.

Chart 3

b. On the other hand, the deployment of MX threatens to affect the survivability of their own ICBMs by the late 80s, as shown on Chart 3.

B. Possible Soviet Responses.

1. In projecting what decisions the Soviets might make, we assume they will want to preserve and extend their gains, if possible. They probably assume that with or without SALT, US programs such as cruise missiles, Trident, and MX will come to fruition.

a. Under SALT, to maintain their counterforce capability the Soviets would have options to deploy their one new ICBM allowed with 10 RVs--to maximize the warheads available to attack MX shelters. Without SALT, the Soviets could also increase the number of RVs on their currently deployed heavy ICBMs.


b. To improve their force survivability they could, under SALT, deploy larger numbers of SLBMs or deploy mobile ICBMs, or both, but only at the expense of reducing fixed ICBMs. They could also deploy long-range cruise missiles. Without SALT, they would be free to build mobile systems of any type. They could also try defending their ICBMs by a widespread ABM system.

C. By the end of decade, the survivability of fixed ICBMs will become a problem for both sides, because further improvements in ICBM accuracies will make even the hardest silos vulnerable. This will increasingly create pressures to go towards mobile systems. We already have evidence the Soviets are developing at least one mobile ICBM. A trend towards mobile systems, particularly cruise missiles and ICBMs, will make verification of future SALT agreements even more difficult.

TOP SECRET

25X1

# CHART 1



NOTE: Charts 2 and 3 not yet available.

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7

1970s: 1.5-2.0% during 1981-85.

- Oil is entering a no growth stage.
  - Because the Soviets have pursued an all-out drilling program in West Siberia, oil production may be maintained in the next year or two at about the current level.
  - This strategy, however, cannot be kept up for more than a year or two because depletion of easily accessible "high flow" reserves would force production down.
- Coal production and nuclear power program are also lagging badly.

Graphic #3: B. USSR: Increments to the Working Age Population-

- Soviet Union must cope with increasingly severe labor shortage in 1980s.
- Additions to labor force in coming decade will be one-quarter 1970s.
  - Most will consist of relatively less-skilled and less mobile Muslims.

C. Productivity is also slowing because of

- rising raw material costs,
- greater distances to transport resources, and
- lack of incentives.

D. Soviet growth, in fact, has already started to slow precipitously:

- Back-to-back harvest failures have left the agricultural sector in disarray.
- Per capita meat consumption, a key standard by which Soviet citizens judge their welfare, may be driven to 1970 level.
- Industrial growth has slowed sharply. Growth lowest since World War II.
- Overall GNP growth for last 2 years has averaged only 1% annually.

Graphic #4: E. Growth in Soviet Defense Spending and GNP

- As a result, the burden of continued defense spending at 4-5 percent per year is already beginning to rise and could increase sharply by 1985.

III. Policy Implications - This will force the Soviets to make some exceedingly tough policy decisions.

- A. In a nutshell, their problem is that increments to national output in 1980s will be too small to permit simultaneous achievement of:



SECRET 

25X1

- continued increases in defense spending at 4-5% per year,
- more investment to problem areas such as agriculture, energy, and transportation,
- support to Eastern Europe, and
- continued modest increases in consumer welfare.

B. Simply stated, something will have to give.

IV. Near-Term Policy Direction - While publication of the 1981-85 plan is still 2 months away, its basic direction is clear.

A. Defense continues to receive top priority.

- We have no indication of a cut-back in any major defense programs. Floor space for the production of major weapons systems continues to grow rapidly.
- Military related R&D programs are at all-time high.
- While costly to economy, the USSR for political and military reasons continues to provide extensive foreign aid to non-communist LDCs. In 1979 Soviet military sales to non-communist LDCs totaled \$8.8 billion and new economic aid commitments stood at \$2.6 billion.
- Leadership speeches indicate they view the international situation as the worst in 15 years and anticipate they will have to deal with a substantial buildup in NATO forces.

B. Because we believe Soviet defense effort will retain its priority in near term, the bind on investment will become increasingly tight.

C. Moscow will pay increased lip-service to consumer needs, but no major reallocation of resources toward consumers is in the offing.

V. Soviet Economic Relations with Eastern Europe and the West - Because of their domestic economic problems, we have no indications that Moscow intends to change its economic dealing with Eastern Europe or the West.

A. For years Soviets have been trying to reduce the cost of maintaining their hegemony over Eastern Europe by reducing their trade subsidies.

- In light of events in Poland, however, Moscow seems intent on providing increased economic aid--at least in short-term--to tide them over.
- A strong hard currency position allows them to do so.

B. Moscow also needs, more than ever, access to Western technology and equipment.

- The best example is USSR-Western Europe gas deal.

SECRET 

25X1

SECRET 

25X1

Largest deal ever with West (\$10 billion in potential equipment sales).

- The Soviets continue to seek equipment and technology, and want to renew the US-USSR long-term grain agreement.

- Chances are that in the next few years, Moscow will be unable to acquire more than two-thirds of their grain import needs from non-US sources.
- The Soviets also have indicated they prefer sophisticated US technology and equipment where possible. They continue to seek, for example, US compressors for their gas pipelines rather than somewhat less advanced ones from Western Europe.

C. Nevertheless, as shown by Afghanistan, Soviets are quite willing to sacrifice any benefits from US trade for what they perceive as overriding political or military goals.

- Indeed, Soviets remain sanguine that they can elicit trade agreements from Western Europe even in the face of US opposition.

VI. Future Alternatives - Over the next few years, Moscow probably will be unwilling to undertake any major reallocation of resources, or risk changing the current system of centralized control.

A. The current leadership seems to be marking time. It prefers tinkering at the margins; alternatives are too risky.

B. During the early 1980s, however, a change in leadership is likely.

- Brezhnev is in poor health.
- Most of those who hold key positions are in their 70s.

C. Even a new leadership would be hard pressed in the short run to make changes.

- They would need time to consolidate power.
- They might reason that by 1990s major difficulties will pass.

D. We do not think the strategy of "marking time" is tenable in long run; Soviet economic problems are too severe.

E. As the problems become more acute, Soviet leaders could impose more austerity on the economy to support military spending.

- Consumption would suffer greatly.
- To garner public support, Moscow would likely evoke an

SECRET 

25X1

SECRET 

25X1

image of heightened danger from West or China

- This policy could also probably mean less reliance on economic relations with West and less tolerance toward EE.

F. Alternatively, a younger set of leaders, less committed to the status quo, might view a change in resource allocation policy in favor of consumers as a more viable way of maintaining "super power" status.

- Even so, a major shift in priorities away from defense would require the convergence of:
  - economic problems at home severe enough to raise questions concerning internal political stability.
  - an international environment that does not press the Soviets (e.g., resurgence of detente).
  - a stable Eastern Europe.

SECRET 


25X1

Figure 1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090007-7

Soviet GNP as a Share of US

(Percent)



Soviet GNP Components as a Share of US

(Percent)





Figure 2

USSR: Primary Energy Production


Average Annual Percent Change



GRAPHIC 3 OPTION 1

USSR: Growth of Working Age Population

(Annual increment in million persons)



GRAPHIC 3, OPTION 2

Figure 3  
USSR: Increments to  
the Working Age  
Population  
(Males 16-59,  
Females 16-54)




Figure 4

# GROWTH IN SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING AND GNP

